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Imre Finta was accused of being a key official in the rounding up and deportation 
of Jews in Szeged, Hungary to Auschwitz, a Nazi death camp, and to Strasshof, a 
Nazi concentration camp.1 The round up had six phases. First, the Jews were 
identified and required to wear a yellow star. Second, all their property was 
seized. Third, they were removed to ghettoes. Fourth, the Jews were moved to 
a large concentration centre where all valuables were taken from them. Fifth, they 
were taken to the transport trains, and finally they were transported, most 
commonly for extermination at Auschwitz.
Finta was accused of being in charge of bringing Jews from the ghettoes to the 
concentration centre in Szeged. He was allegedly in charge of the concentration 
centre and his responsibilities supposedly included making sure that the Jews were 
kept in the brickyard and could not escape. He also took charge of taking 
valuables from them and his trial counsel admitted that Finta made daily 
announcements demanding that the prisoners relinquish all valuables on pain of 
death. Finally, he allegedly supervised the loading of the prisoners onto boxcars 
which took the Jews to their deaths at Auschwitz or to forced labour in Strasshof.
The Finta prosecution has an unusual legal history. Sabina Citron, a 
Holocaust survivor, publicly accused Finta of committing war crimes. Finta denied 
her charges and called her a liar. She sued him for libel. When the case went to 
trial, Finta did not defend the action and he was ordered to pay Mrs. Citron 
$30,000 plus court costs.
CTV broadcast a report accusing Finta of being a war criminal and Finta sued 
the network for libel. CTV engaged in extensive preparation for the trial, 
including obtaining videotape commission evidence in Austria, Hungary and Israel. 
After CTV accumulated the evidence, Finta withdrew his libel suit. The Court 
ordered Finta to pay the court costs of CTV and when he did not pay, CTV seized 
and sold his house at auction.
The evidence against Finta is overwhelming and unanswered. Finta presented 
no evidence to answer the charges brought against him, either at his libel trials or 
at his criminal prosecution. When asked at his criminal trial if he wanted to call 
evidence on his own behalf, he declined. Yet, Finta was acquitted. How is it 
possible that Finta could win his case when he called no evidence on his own 
behalf and the evidence against him was overwhelming? The answer is that there 
was a stacked jury and an appeal to racial prejudice.
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Stacking the Jury
Douglas Christie, counsel for Finta, asked potential jurors, “Are you a member or 
supporter of any organization which advocated or opposed the prosecution of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity, or advocated or opposed changes in the 
Criminal Code in that regard?”2 This initial question was not proposed either by 
the Crown or by the defence. It was suggested by the trial judge, Mr. Justice 
Archie Campbell, to replace a series of questions advanced by Christie. The 
questions Christie had suggested were designed to exclude all Jews from the jury.
The problem with the judge’s replacement question is that it had the same 
result as the questions proposed by Christie. All major Jewish organizations are 
in favour of the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity without 
exception. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of Jews in the community would 
be excluded by virtue of the question.
It might be proper to ask potential jurors if they are opposed to the existence 
of a law they might be asked to apply because, if a juror is opposed, there might 
be some concern that the or she would not apply the law. However, the question 
Christie asked would be improper even if it had no ethnic or exclusionary effect. 
In ordinary murder trials potential jurors are not asked if they are members of an 
organization that favours the existence of a law against murder or if they are 
personally in favour of a law against murder.
How is it possibly relevant to the duty of a juror whether he or she is in favour 
of an existing law? It was relevant to Douglas Christie because he wanted a jury 
inclined to nullification. He wanted a jury which would not consider Finta’s guilt 
or innocence, but would find him “not guilty” because they did not believe in the 
law. Douglas Christie wanted to remove from the jury those who believed that the 
law should be applied. Surely this was an improper purpose and the court should 
have had no part in it. By suggesting a question that played into Christie’s strategy 
of obtaining such a jury the judge committed a serious error.
Improper Statements
There are three sets of improper statements that Douglas Christie made that the 
judge did not correct either adequately or at all. In one set of remarks, Douglas 
Christie asserted the moral equivalence of Jews and Nazis, and of Canada today 
and Nazi Germany. The nature of his argument was that it was mere circum­
stance that what Finta and the Nazis were charged with is illegal today.
2R  v. Finta (10 November 1989) Court Transcript at 10-11 (Ont. CA.). Note that there were two 
additional questions to be asked, as follow up, if the answer was yes.
Tomorrow, what the Nazis did could be considered legal, and therefore what Finta 
was charged with doing could be legal as well. Specifically, what Douglas Christie 
said is, “You had better have moral certainty if you are to convict, because if 
somebody 45 years from now puts you on trial in another country for persecuting 
Imre Finta and that country might be as hostile to Jews as we are to Nazis, who 
would you be calling? Don’t call me.”3 Elsewhere he said “You never know in 
this crazy world, what we do today is lawful and might be some kind of crime 
tomorrow.”4
The equivalence of Jews and Nazis, of Canada and Nazi Germany, in Douglas 
Christie’s jury address, invites the jury into the moral world of Nazism. It invites 
them to find that what the Nazis i d  was not wrong, but just circumstantially, at 
this time and place, illegal. The Crown and the Judge commented on these 
remarks a good deal because they amounted to an invitation to equate convicting 
Finta with persecuting him.
While there is no doubt that this aspect of the remarks raises a sound 
argument for a new trial, this is not all that is wrong with the remarks. Equating 
Jews to Nazis, Canada to Nazi Germany, and proclaiming the moral relativity of 
crimes against Humanity is hot on the same level as, for example, asserting 
relativity of the right to choice in an abortion case. It mischaracterizes the very 
nature of crimes against humanity. The laws on war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are peremptory norms of international law, jus cogens. These norms are 
accepted and recognized by the international community as a whole as norms from 
which no derogation is permitted. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, a treaty is void if it conflicts with any peremptory norm of international 
law.5
These norms of international law are few and far between. Ian Brownlie, in 
his treatise on international law, lists only six that are without significant 
controversy.6 One of these six is crimes against humanity. As these norms of 
international law are basic to humanity, to say that tomorrow crimes against 
humanity may cease to be crimes, as Christie did, is to say that tomorrow 
humanity may cease to be human.
War crimes and crimes against humanity are malum in se, not malum 
prohibitum. Crimes malum in se are wrong in themselves, while crimes malum 
prohibitum are wrong only because they are prohibited. The Law Reform
3Supra, note 2 at 10838,10839.
4IbkL at 10897.
5(1969) 1155 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 53.
^Principles of Public International Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Oxford Press, 1979) at 513.
Commission of Canada has written that crimes malum in se are “not only 
punishable by law, but also meriting punishment.” They argue that such crimes 
“are not just forbidden, they are also wrong.” To ignore these crimes is “to be 
less than human” and to do nothing about such crimes “is tantamount to 
condoning [them].” Therefore “to be fully human” means responding when such 
crimes are committed.7
The Law Reform Commission also noted that only a minority of criminal 
offences are malum in se. The majority of crimes are malum prohibitum and are 
not necessarily wrong in themselves, but are prohibited for expediency. The 
Commission objected to diluting the basic message of criminal law by jum bling 
together wrongful acts and acts prohibited for simple convenience. The 
Commission reasoned that if we do so we may end up thinking that real crimes 
are no more important than mere regulatory offences.8 Yet, Douglas Christie did 
exactly that. He equated war crimes and crimes against humanity to mere 
regulatory offences which may be gone or different tomorrow. The trial judge said 
nothing to sort out the jumble Christie presented to the jury.
The laws against war crimes and crimes against humanity are human rights 
laws which punish gross and flagrant violations of the most basic human rights 
standards. In the words of Mr. Justice McIntyre, speaking for the Supreme Court 
of Canada about the Ontario Human Rights Code, “Legislation of this type is of 
a special nature, not quite constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary, and 
it is for courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect.”9 Douglas Christie’s 
remarks gave the impression that the war crimes law was ordinary legislation and 
what the judge said did not contradict or correct that impression.
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Deschenes, in his report for the Commission of 
Inquiry on War Criminals,10 went so far as to say that war crimes can form the 
basis of criminal prosecution, even if there is domestic law to the contrary, by 
virtue of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .11
If a person is charged with driving on the wrong side of the street, it is no 
doubt improper to say in defence that tomorrow we may all be driving on the
7Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report: Our Criminal Laws (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1976) at
sIbid at 11.
9Re O.H.R.C. et al. and Simpson Sears (1986), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 329.
10Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals Report, Part /: Public (Ottawa: Canadian Government 
Publishing Centre, 30 December 1986) at 132.
uPart I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter Charter].
opposite side of the road. However, to say that tomorrow Jews may be in the 
position Nazis are today, or that tomorrow Canada may be in the position Nazi 
Germany was during World War II, is not an equivalent error. It is an error that 
is much more serious. It is an invocation of Nazi immorality. It ignores the 
distinction between crimes malum in se and crimes malum prohibitum. It turns 
a blind eye to the peremptory nature of the Canadian norms of international law, 
and it ignores the quasi-constitutional status of the offences for which Finta was 
charged.
Douglas Christie did not just downgrade the war crimes law to the level of a 
regulatory offence. He argued it was positively evil. He referred to the law as 
diabolical, meaning it was the work of the devil.12 The Crown referred to this 
remark in ground 9(b) of its Notice of Appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
The judge again under-reacted and merely said that, “[Christie] is entitled to his 
opinion.” The judge also noted that it was not really relevant and that the law 
was constitutionally valid.13 Saying it was constitutionally valid, and no more, 
placed it on the same level as all other laws. His statement ignored the standing 
a war crimes and crimes against humanity law has in the legal Hierarchy. The 
judge’s correction was indeed a misstatement of the law.
The third problem in the trial is the appeal to religious or ethnic prejudice in 
Douglas Christie’s remarks. He introduced religion into the proceedings in a 
number of different ways. First, he quoted from the New Testament at length. 
The purpose of the quote appeared to be to appeal to the stereotype that the Jews 
killed Christ through bearing false witness in a Roman court.14 Douglas Christie 
spoke of a conviction against Finta as vengeance against the accused.15 However, 
Christie also spoke of a circle of vengeance in which he, by his own 
acknowledgement, was attempting to convey the idea of vengeance against the 
Jews leading to vengeance against Finta.16 The notion of vengeance against the 
Jews only makes sense if the Jews did something which prompted vengeance, even 
though it may not have been justified. The something to which Douglas Christie 
referred was, again, the notion that the Jews killed Christ.
On several occasions, Douglas Christie distinguished between swearing an oath 
and making an affirmation. When he referred to Jewish witnesses, he habitually 
noted that these witnesses “affirmed”. Indeed, he asserted that the Jewish
12Supra, note 2 at 11865 (Crown refers to remarie of Douglas Christie).
13Ibid. at 11485-11487.
l4Ibid. at 10871-10874.
15The Crown noted this statement in ground 9(e) of its Grounds of Appeal to the Ontario Court of
Appeal.
witnesses affirmed, even though in some cases they swore.17 In his charge, the 
judge directed the jury that there is no distinction in law between swearing and 
affirming.18 However, that direction failed to capture the true gravity of what 
Douglas Christie was doing. The continued reference to affirming can arguably 
be linked to his references that the Jews killed Christ through false witness. The 
reference to affirming was not just a devaluation of affirming, but was, as well, an 
appeal to religious prejudice.
A second anti-Jewish stereotype to which Douglas Christie appealed is the 
notion that Jews are mercenary or greedy. He implied that Jewish witnesses were 
in court to testify against Finta because the Crown was paying them to do so. He 
said that one witness only “came because for one thing it was a trip, I don’t blame 
her, nice hotels, free lunch, great time.”19 About the witnesses in general he said 
that “there’s only one person in this room who isn’t paid to be here and it is not 
a witness.”20 The Judge did not comment on these remarks. These remarks not 
only misrepresent reality, but they are yet another appeal to religious or ethnic 
prejudice.
A third anti-Jewish stereotype to which Christie appealed is the notion that the 
Jews are vengeful. When Douglas Christie spoke of the prosecution of Finta as 
vengeance, he was referring to the vengefulness of the Jewish community, not of 
the Crown. For instance, when commenting on an unidentified man in the court 
audience who was improperly signalling to a witness, he said that “[i]t is the team 
work, a team effort. I don’t blame Jews for feeling it is us against the world and 
the world persecutes us and we have to show how much we have been hurt.”21 
He said as well that “much as Jews have suffered over the years, that is no 
justification for taking part in a trial to help fabricate evidence.”22 Douglas 
Christie directly referred to the Jewish witnesses as vengeful when he said, “These 
people who come here for [sic] malice towards Finta after 45 years were 
expressing vengeance against a man who represented to them a system they didn’t 
like.”23
17See: letter from Kenneth Narvey to Hon. Kim Campbell (9 July 1990) Ottawa for a complete listing 
of these incidents.
lsSupra, note 2 at 11571-11572.
19Ibid. at 11051.
xIbid. at 11052.
21Ibid at 2980.
nIbid. at 11048,11049.
This appeal to the stereotype of Jews as vengeful could not have been more 
blatant. The Globe and Mail published an article in which was written, “Anti- 
Semites say [the trial] is pushed by Jews seeking revenge.”24 Douglas Christie 
actually asked the Court to order a mistrial because of the article, arguing that it 
characterized the defence he intended to present as anti-Semitic. He said “[the 
Globe and Mail] took some deliberation to put together a prejudicial piece of 
character assassination which casts the defence, if they wish to suggest revenge, in 
the role of anti-Semites.”25
To say that a particular witness is vengeful, when there is some evidence to 
suggest it, is perfectly proper. However, that was not Douglas Christie’s position. 
To suggest that all Jews are vengeful, when there is no such evidence is 
unadulterated racial prejudice. That was Douglas Christie’s stated position. Yet, 
he asked for a mistrial, in part, because his assertion was correctly called anti- 
Semitic. In other words, Christie wanted to conduct an anti-Semitic defence 
without anyone having the power to call it anti-Semitic. Anti-Semitism, as a label, 
has become disreputable. Douglas Christie wanted to present his anti-Semitism 
to the jury and convince them of it without the prejudicial label of anti-Semitism 
being applied to what he was doing.
The judge, again, was either oblivious to what Christie was doing or failed to 
appreciate its significance. The judge ruled that “the article associates the defence 
that Mr. Finta may well raise with respect to arguments on credibility, with anti- 
Semitism, and thereby associates a legitimate defence ... with anti-Semitism.”26 
The judge assumed that Christie was planning to conduct a legitimate defence 
based on evidence that a witness or witnesses were vengeful. Instead, he 
conducted the illegitimate defence that all Jews are vengeful, without evidence, 
based on prejudice alone. Even if it was not apparent at that point in the trial 
what Douglas Christie was planning to do, it was certainly apparent at the end of 
the trial what he had done. Yet, at no time did the judge do anything to change 
his earlier ruling or to effectively counteract Christie’s actions.
Douglas Christie was attempting to have the jury adopt a Nazi frame of 
reference. He conducted his defence so as to try to have the jury think as Nazis 
would have thought during World War II. His appeal to anti-Jewish stereotypes 
was not just an attempt to discredit the witnesses, it was an attempt to credit 
Nazism and to persuade the jury that the anti-Jewish stereotypes under which the 
Nazis operated were correct. For instance, he suggested to expert witness 
Randolph Braham that “[y]ou acknowledge, I trust, that Jews were very
2477½ Globe and Mail (29 December 1989).
25Supra, note 2 at 2980.
26Ibid at 2989.
sympathetic at that time to Communism, were they not?”27 and asked if “[i]n fact, 
it’s true, isn’t it, that most of the post-war Communists were Jewish?”28 The 
notion of Jews as Communists was, and is, a Nazi stereotype used to justify the 
Holocaust. Douglas Christie went to great lengths to equate Jews with 
Communists. On a number of different occasions he identified a particular 
Hungarian Communist and then asked the witness if the named Communist was 
Jewish. How is that relevant, even to Christie, to the guilt or innocence of Imre 
Finta? It is relevant because Christie is suggesting that Jews are Communists and 
therefore, the Nazis were justified in doing what they did to the Jews.
Finally, reinforcing these very specific anti-Jewish remarks, Christie added a 
number of more general references to religion. He said that “the judgment you 
give will be also the judgment that we get from God.”29 He also said that “God, 
who is referred to in the Bible you swore your oath on, judges all of us too and 
vengeance isn’t justice.”30 These remarks, besides incorporating the themes of 
vengeance and affirmation, bring God into the trial. The Crown objected to these 
propositions as a threat to the jury. This is a legitimate and objectionable aspect 
of their nature. However, the repeated references to God by Christie were also 
an attempt to reinforce the anti-Je wish stereotypes he played upon and an 
implication that God was on his side, or at least on the side of the propositions he 
was putting forward.
The only thing that the judge said about Christie’s references to God was that 
it was “not my department.”31 The judge also said that “[y]ou cannot let your 
decisions be affected by prejudice”, but did not make reference to any religious 
or ethnic prejudice in particular.32 In light of what Douglas Christie had been 
saying, the judge’s response was an acute under-reaction. Once again, his actions 
did not confront the problems posed by Christie’s address.
The cumulative effect of Douglas Christie’s various appeals to religious and 
ethnic prejudice must be taken into account. Even if any one of those appeals in 
isolation may not seem significant, their effect taken as a whole is greater than 
each one separately. Courts cannot assume that jurors will be immune to the risks 
resulting from attempts to convey religious and ethnic prejudice. The fact is that 
an element of religious and ethnic bigotry exists in Canadian society and an appeal
21 Ibid. at 2325.
™Ibid. at 2330.
s Ibid. at 11487.
xIbid. at 11487.
uIbid. at 11488.
nIbid. at 11499.
to religious or ethnic prejudice may be successful. The prosecution should not 
have to run the risk of the existence of prejudice. Once an appeal to prejudice is 
made there is the chance that it may affect the verdict and this danger should not 
be present.
Once an effort to exploit religious or ethnic prejudice reaches a certain level, 
a direction from a judge, no matter how specific, may not be able to cure the 
defect in the trial. The direction serves to focus greater attention on the 
discriminatory remarks and on the fact that the witnesses are part of the targeted 
group. In the alternative, if the judge in this case could have repaired the damage 
by a specific direction, he gave no such direction. However, this inability to 
correct an aggressively inflammatory appeal to prejudice does not justify saying 
nothing. The judge must try to correct the damage as best as she or he can. The 
level of appeal to religious and ethnic prejudice in this case was such that it 
damaged the fairness of the trial beyond repair.
There is a good deal of legal authority to the effect that a counsel’s appeal to 
religious prejudice, or even to religion, is inflammatory and improper.33 In the 
United States, where jury trials for civil cases are more common, the issue of 
appeals to religious prejudice has arisen in several cases. In a recent case 
involving a medical malpractice suit against a Jewish doctor, the Anti-Defamation 
League of B’nai B’rith filed an amicus brief arguing that improper references to 
religion by plaintiff’s counsel denied the defendant due process and prevented a 
fair trial.34
Another problem with Finta’s trial are the repeated statements of Holocaust 
denial by Douglas Christie. Holocaust denial was more a tactic Christie used in 
cross-examining witnesses than an element of his charge to the jury. One of the 
Crown’s grounds of appeal (ground 30) confronted this problem of Holocaust 
denial. It stated that the trial judge erred in law in allowing defence counsel to 
cross-examine at length on the policy of extermination and gas chambers. 
However, it is not clear from that ground of appeal whether the Crown objected 
only because of the irrelevancy of these questions to the trial, or whether the 
Crown was concerned with the introduction of Holocaust denial into the trial.
Holocaust denial is not just a denial of fact. For neo-Nazis, it is a modern 
version of both self-exoneration and anti-Semitism. Denials of the Holocaust go 
hand in hand with assertions that Jews fabricate the claim of the Holocaust for 
self-serving purposes. For instance, this neo-Nazi approach was evident in 
questions Christie asked witness Randolph Braham. He asked, “You yourself are
^See R  v. Richard (1957), 43 M.P.R. 229; R  v. Lopacco (1983), 2 OA.C. 177; R  v. House (1921), 16 
Cr. App. R. 149; and R  v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R 16.
^Miller v. Schaefer (1989), 317 Md. 609. The case was decided on another point.
Jewish and you have a bias, right?”35 Objectively, it is hard to imagine what bias 
Braham would have because he is Jewish. The bias to which Christie was 
referring was the bias that the Holocaust existed. Christie was positing that the 
existence of the Holocaust was a matter of controversy, rather than an acknow­
ledged fact. Braham, he was suggesting, had a bias in this supposed controversy 
because he was Jewish.
Douglas Christie made the purport of these remarks quite dear later in the 
trial. He asked, “It is very difficult for a Jewish person to be unbiased about the 
subject of the Holocaust?” and “You [Randolph] advance the Jewish 
understanding of history?”36 This Holocaust denial-oriented questioning of 
Braham was prolonged and elaborate.
Christie’s questioning of the witness Wolfgang Scheffler was similar. In one 
exchange, Christie tied together his themes of Holocaust denial and Jews as greedy 
people. He suggested that Jews deny the Holocaust in order to make money 
through reparations. Douglas Christie asked, “Dr. Scheffler, the Holocaust is big 
business, isn’t it?”37 The Crown objected and Christie replied, “It is my intention 
to suggest that there is a motive on the part of many people who are Zionists to 
exaggerate these things [the Holocaust] to inflate their claims [for reparations].” 
The ruling of the judge was to “go ahead.”38
After Douglas Christie went on in this vein for quite some time, the judge 
finally stopped him, not on the basis that what Christie was doing was an appeal 
to ethnic prejudice, but solely on the basis that the issue of reparations was outside 
the area of expertise of the witness.39 Even that ruling was made after the jury 
was out of the courtroom. The judge said nothing at all to the jury to correct or 
counter what Christie had just done.
Christie’s Holocaust denial, through the questioning of witnesses, was not 
stopped or corrected by the judge. It was another very particular form of appeal 
to ethnic prejudice. The closest the judge came to dealing with the improprieties 
in Christie’s questioning was a statement in his jury address that what counsel 
suggests to the witnesses is not evidence.40 However, that statement is woefully 
inadequate to deal with the problem Christie’s persistent denial of the Holocaust
35Supra, note 2 at 1972.
“ibid. at 2004.
^Ibid. at 3075.
xIbid. at 3076.
xIbid at 3083-3085.
40Ibid. at 11493.
posed to the jury. Once Christie opened up the issue through his questioning, the 
Crown wanted to contradict this denial by submitting evidence of the Holocaust. 
However, the judge refused to allow the Crown to do so.
Douglas Christie’s statements were outrageous. Equating Jews and Nazis or 
Canada and Nazi Germany, calling the law diabolical, appealing to religious and 
ethnic prejudice, and denying the Holocaust, are outlandish assertions one does 
not expect to hear from defence counsel under any circumstances. When Christie 
suggested that a conviction might be seen forty-five years from now as persecution, 
Judge Campbell replied that he did “not propose to dignify that kind of suggestion 
by spending such time on it.”41 The judge may have spent little or no time on 
Christie’s most outrageous statements for that very reason.
This reticence was an error and, in itself, prevented the trial from being fair. 
When egregious statements of the kind made by Douglas Christie are presented 
to a court, there is a dignified and undignified way of responding to them. 
However, it is wrong in principle to say that responding to them at all is an 
indignity. It is undignified to respond to a suggestion that the Holocaust did not 
exist by going into great detail to show that the Holocaust did exist. It would treat 
the notion that the Holocaust did not exist as if it were worthy of serious consi­
deration. It would even suggest that a person concerned with the truth might 
seriously believe that the Holocaust did not take place and such a response is 
unworthy of a court.
However, it is not undignified to point out what is happening, what the 
intentions are, and what the intended effect is when someone says the Holocaust 
did not occur. It is not undignified to point out that Holocaust denial is a form 
of neo-Nazi hate propaganda or to explain why neo-Nazis deny the Holocaust and 
the purpose it serves them in promoting Nazism. It is not inappropriate to outline 
as fact that hate propaganda is a criminal offence in Canada and that there has 
already been a criminal conviction for Holocaust denial.42 Moreover, it is not 
undignified to take judicial notice of the Holocaust.
One can say that there is a dignified way of approaching all the outrageous 
statements made by Christie. Simply to ignore them because of their outrageous 
and extreme nature ignores the harm they cause to the trial. The cumulative 
effect of these errors was to make the trial unfair. In light of the verdict, and the 
nature of the defence, there is every likelihood that the jury did not address their 
minds to the guilt or innocence of Imre Finta. It is likely that their verdict was an 
exercise in jury nullification and that they decided that the law should not be
41Ibid. at 11486.
42R. v. Keegstra (1990), 1 GR. (4th) 129 (S.CC).
applied, whether Finta was guilty or not. Justice requires a new trial because this 
likelihood was created by the defence and not effectively counteracted by the 
judge.
However, Finta did not just win at trial. He also won at the Court of Appeal. 
How is it possible that he got away with jury stacking and anti-Semitism before the 
Ontario Court of Appeal? One reason is that on appeal the Crown did not 
challenge Finta on these points. The Crown agreed at trial to the question that 
was put to potential jurors. Once the Crown filed its notice of appeal, B’nai B’rith 
wrote to the Crown asking that the grounds of appeal be amended to include the 
issue of jury stacking.43 The Crown refused.
In response to the anti-Semitic avalanche of Christie at the trial, the Crown 
said nothing. Nor, at the time of the appeal, did the Crown initially propose that 
Christie’s attempts to arouse racial, religious, or ethnic prejudice be a ground for 
appeal. B’nai B’rith also proposed that the grounds of appeal be amended to 
include Christie’s attempts to arouse racial, religious and ethnic prejudice against 
Jews. The Crown acceded to this request, but only partially. The Crown 
challenged, on appeal, the anti-Semitic remarks Christie made at the time of his 
address to the jury. However, the Crown did not challenge the unending stream 
of anti-Semitic remarks Christie made when he was questioning witnesses.
Regarding Christie’s charge to the jury, Mr. Justice Dubin of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal wrote in his judgment:
In my opinion, the inflammatory address tainted the trial, and the trial judge’s 
comments about it in his charge to the jury fell far short of instructing the juiy that 
they could not approach their duties in the manner that defence counsel invited 
them to do. This resulted in prejudice to the Crown’s right to a fair trial, and 
which prejudice was not cured by the trial judge’s instructions.
Mr. Justice Tamopolsky agreed with Mr. Justice Dubin, but they were in the 
minority. The majority, while not approving of Christie’s address to the jury, 
thought that what the judge said about it was sufficient to overcome the prejudice 
to the Crown’s case. The Crown said nothing on appeal about the inflammatory 
anti-Semitic questioning of witnesses. As a result, neither did the judges in their 
reasons. For the Court of Appeal, it was as if it never happened.
The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. It had an appeal as 
of right on the grounds of dissent in the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Crown 
also applied for leave to add other grounds. The grounds for leave did not include 
jury stacking or appeals to religious prejudice during the questioning of witnesses. 
Since the Crown had not raised those grounds at the level of the Ontario Court
43Letter from B’nai B’rith to the Crown (16 October 1990) Ottawa.
of Appeal, it was perhaps not surprising that they also were not raised before the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
B’nai B’rith wrote to the Minister of Justice, Kim Campbell, and asked her to 
add jury stacking and appeals to religious prejudice during questioning of witnesses 
to the grounds for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.44 She wrote 
back by letter stating that:
I share your concern with defence counsel’s improper questioning of witnesses; 
however, my officials are of the view that, in light of the wide discretion enjoyed 
by a trial judge in regard to the manner of questioning witnesses and the difficulty 
in proving that this affected the ultimate outcome of the trial, an appeal on that 
ground is not viable. In addition, they do not share your view that the juiy was 
improperly selected.45
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal 
on 24 March 1994. Mr. Justice Cory observed that Christie’s statements were 
“unprofessional and prejudicial.”46 However, he held that the directions of the 
trial judge remedied the prejudice.47 Lamer CJ. and Gonthier and Major JJ. 
concurred. The dissenting judgment of La Forest J., with which McLachlin and 
L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. concurred, did not consider this issue.
It is time to draw some lessons from this experience. One lesson is that the 
best case in the world can go awry when the jury is stacked and defence counsel 
is allowed to appeal to religious prejudice without hindrance. The Crown in Finta 
was hard-working, highly motivated, learned, and well prepared. Yet, they were 
still blind sided. The Minister of Justice, Kim Campbell, wrote in her letter that 
the, “Crown counsel did in fact object on many occasions to the improper 
questioning of witnesses by defence counsel at trial.”48 It is true that Crown 
counsel did object, but the objections were on the ground of relevancy, not on the 
ground of appeal to religious prejudice. It was not even clear that Crown counsel 
was aware of the stereotypes that Christie was trying to invoke. In another 
context, that sort of ignorance might be admirable. In the context of what was 
happening in Finta, this ignorance was fatal to the Crown’s case.
In future cases, the Crown should be prepared for the sort of defence that 
Christie used in the Finta case, and not just because Christie or one of his acolytes 
may end up defending those accused of war crimes in the future. A war crimes
^Letter from B’nai B’rith to Hon. Kim Campbell (11 June 1992) Ottawa.
^Letter from Hon. Kim Campbell to B’nai B’rith (28 August 1992) Ottawa.
“K  v. Finta, [1994] S.CJ. No. 26, 23023/23047 at 80.
41 Ibid. at 81.
48Supra, note 45.
prosecution is like a hate propaganda prosecution, except it is worse. At least in 
hate propaganda cases there is the possibility that the accused does not believe 
what he is saying and that it is all just a fraud. This possibility was accepted by 
juries in the two false news prosecutions against Ernst Zundel.49 However, in 
war crimes cases there is little doubt that the guilty have come to believe hate 
propaganda.
There is no rational explanation for mass murder. The only explanation is the 
irrational one, that the perpetrators have fallen under the sway of hate 
propaganda. Perpetrators really believe the lies, the hatred, the stereotypes. If 
they did not believe from the very beginning, they come to believe as they kill or 
after they kill, simply to rationalize their behaviour in their own minds. It is this 
self-delusion that leads perpetrators to participate in the crimes for which they are 
charged. The first victims of hate propaganda are its believers. They have to 
destroy themselves spiritually before they can destroy others physically.
Christie was parading anti-Semitic stereotypes in court, not just to inflame the 
jury, but because, in a sense, he was presenting what he saw as Finta’s true 
defence. According to Christie, Finta acted as he did because he really believed 
that Jews were Communists, that Jews were out for money, and that vengeance 
against them was justified.
The War Crimes units in the Department of Justice and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.) engage in historical research for the preparation of 
cases. However, the historical research component does not include research into 
the history of the ideology of hatred. It is a trite aphorism that those who do not 
learn from history are condemned to repeat it. In a microcosm, that proverb was 
being played out at Finta’s trial. The courtroom became a theatre for the re­
enactment of the anti-Jewish prejudices and stereotypes of World War II. Since 
the Crown had not learned and prepared itself from the history of hatred that led 
to the Holocaust, it ended up reliving that hatred in the courtroom. The Crown 
and the Court were bewildered in the face of such an onslaught.
In spite of the fact that the Crown was blind sided in the Finta case, it is 
reasonable to expect an appeal to racial prejudice in every war crimes case 
involving mass murder, no matter where or when the war crime occurred. The 
mere fact that this sort of defence is not a defence in law should not, especially 
after Finta’s trial, delude the Crown into thinking that it will not be raised.
Once a defence based on an appeal to racial prejudice is raised, the Crown 
must be prepared to combat it frontally, not just tangentially. It is not enough to 
say that such a defence is irrelevant. It must be labelled for what it is, an appeal
to racial, religious, or ethnic prejudice. From the moment that the defence 
launches a racial invective in court, whether through questioning of witnesses or 
in any other way, both the Crown and the Court must do everything in their power 
to counteract, and condemn it. Passing it over as irrelevant is simply not enough.
Prosecution of a crime is not just for the victims. It is for society as a whole. 
It is a statement of what society stands for, what it believes, what it accepts and 
what it will not tolerate. Victims are, of course, very interested in the prosecution 
of crimes committed against them. It is particularly troubling for the surviving 
victims of mass murder to observe the prosecution of someone who is accused of 
such crimes and to see the prosecution used as a continuing attack on the 
memories of those who were murdered and on those who survived. It is even 
more difficult to watch the Crown and the Court do virtually nothing in response.
A prosecution is supposed to be a search for a redress and a remedy for the 
crimes that were committed. It is not supposed to be a continuation of the 
victimization. Yet, that is what it becomes when the defence uses the trial as a 
platform for promoting the stereotypes and lies that led to the crimes in the first 
place. A passive prosecution in the face of racially prejudicial defence invective 
not only creates the difficulty of acquittal of a guilty accused, it also causes the 
trial to become a further attack on the victims and the survivors.
The Crown in Finta came prepared to fight one battle — to present the 
evidence and law necessary to get a conviction. As it turned out, there was a 
second battle to be fought for which the Crown was totally unprepared. This was 
the battle to use the courtroom as a forum for anti-Semitic hate propaganda. In 
future war crimes trials, the Crown must never again be unprepared for this sort 
of assault.
As important as this lesson is, there is a much larger lesson to be learned from 
the Finta case and this is one that involves not just the Crown but the government 
as a whole. The problems in the Finta case of jury stacking and appeals to 
religions prejudice were two separate problems that synergized. However, either 
one on its own would have been a problem. Given the jury that was picked, the 
verdict may well have been the same no matter what Christie said or did not say 
and no matter how the defence was conducted after jury selection.
The fact that it is possible to pick such a jury in a war crimes trial tells us first 
of all that we must be alert to this danger. This is a problem virtually unique to 
the war crimes field. When the state prosecutes for murder, it is not necessary to 
canvass the jury to be sure that they believe that the crime of murder should be 
prosecuted. It can be taken for granted that any jury will accept that murder must 
be prosecuted. However, surprising as it may seem, when the state prosecutes for 
participation in mass murder, it is necessary to canvass the jury to be sure that
they believe that the crime should be prosecuted. The Finta case illustrates this 
point. Jury trials are trials of the accused by his or her peers. Jurors represent 
society at large. While legally and morally genocide is a crime, the reality is that 
many people may see it as a crime that should not be prosecuted in Canada.
Old age is no defence to murder, nor should it be. Yet, on a practical level 
many people have sympathy for an elderly accused. There is no statute of 
limitations for murder, but many people are willing to forgive even mass murder 
when it happened a long time ago. People will clamour for the prosecution of a 
neighbour’s murderer. However, when the murderer is the neighbour and the 
victim is a foreigner, killed far away in a foreign land, the clamour for prosecution 
fades. More importantly, as evidenced in the Finta case, when all these factors are 
combined: when the accused is old, when he has been a quiet friendly neighbour 
for decades, when the crime was committed a long time ago and far away in 
another country, and when the victim is a stranger and a foreigner, there are many 
people in Canada who have little or no interest in a prosecution.
The government of Canada should be commended for introducing legislation 
in Parliament to provide for prosecution of war crimes, for steering it through 
Parliament, for setting up the War Crimes units in Justice and the R.C.M.P., and 
for bringing cases to court in the face of this hostile sentiment. However, for the 
government, the Crown and the courts to believe that sentiment has ceased to exist 
just because Parliament has legislated is naive. Parliament does not and cannot 
legislate the beliefs of individuals. As the Finta case has shown, these beliefs still 
remain in a segment of the Canadian population, even if only in a minority 
segment. The Crown and the court must be aware that they may well be faced 
with potential jurors who harbour these beliefs. These jurors should not be 
serving on war crimes juries.
What happened in the Finta case was perverse. Instead of potential jurors 
being excused from jury duty because they did not believe in the law, they were 
in effect, excused from jury duty when they did believe in the law and when they 
were members of an organization that promoted its adoption. However, even if 
that had not happened, it would not have been enough to prevent the jury 
nullification that appears to have occurred. The Crown and the court must take 
the initiative to assure, in every future case, that there is a jury that is prepared to 
enter a conviction, provided the facts justify such a verdict.
If a trial has such a jury, that cannot be the end of the matter. The Crown 
must be prepared to argue the value of the law. Why bring Nazi war criminals to 
justice? Why here? Why now? The reality is that jurors may well be asking 
themselves those questions. The Crown, in every case, must be prepared to 
answer them in order to do its job properly. The Crown has brought, and no 
doubt will continue to bring to court, the factual and legal case for prosecution.
For Nazi war crimes trials, it must also be prepared to bring to court the moral 
case for prosecution.
Even if there is no jury stacking and even if there is no defence based on an 
appeal to religious prejudice, the Crown may well be faced with a jury hesitant to 
apply the law for reasons that have nothing to do with either the facts or the law. 
Unless the Crown can communicate its own belief in the need for the law, in the 
need for enforcement of the law, even the best case in the world may fail.
